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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
vs.
JOSEPH FINANO MOYA,

Case No. 890608-CA
Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant
INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Joseph Finano Moya relies on his
opening brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the
statements of jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts.
Appellant Moya responds to the State's answer to his opening brief
as follows.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant Joseph Moya and the State both agree that the
trial court should not have revoked Appellant's probation.
remedy sought by the two parties is different.

The

Appellant Moya

requests this Court to enter an order of reversal and an order
terminating Utah's custody over him.

The State requests this Court

to order the reversal and then, over six years after the date of his
conviction and sentence, impose a period of probation upon him.
Just as established caselaw prohibits a court from indefinitely
suspending the time period for initiating a probation revocation
action, Appellant requests this Court to prohibit courts from
indefinitely suspending the time period for imposing probation.
Probation should not be imposed.

-1 -

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE POINTS ARGUED BY APPELLANT IN HIS
OPENING BRIEF ALSO APPLY TO THE INDEFINITE
SUSPENSION OF A PROBATIONARY TERM
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief)
The State alleges that "Points I, II and IV of
defendant's [Joseph Moya] appellate brief address issues pertinent
only to the running of a probation term."

Appellee's brief at 5.

According to the State, the aforementioned points were rendered moot
by the trial court's correction of a clerical error.1
brief at 6.

Appellee's

The State misinterprets the scope and application of

the arguments initially presented by Appellant Moya.

As explained

below in Point II of Appellant Moya's reply brief, see infra at 3-9,
the arguments presented in Points I, II and IV of his opening brief
apply, in principle, to arguments stated herein against the
indefinite suspension of a probationary term.

1

Appellant Moya is appealing the trial court's
correction of the "clerical" error. See State v. Moya, District
Court Case No. CR84-892; Court of Appeals Case No. 900445-CA
(Docketing Statement, dated August 30, 1990). Consequently, the
Points argued in Appellant's opening brief may still have a direct
bearing on the case at bar. In the event the trial court's
correction of the "clerical" error is affirmed on appeal, the
arguments presented by Appellant will assume that the probationary
term was stayed.
Regardless of whether Appellant Moya's probation had been
imposed or suspended, the trial court clearly erred by "revoking
Appellant's probation" and reinstating his prison sentence. If
probation had been imposed, it would have terminated by operation of
law eighteen months after the date of sentencing. State v. Green,
757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988). If probation had been stayed, the court
-[cont'd on next page]-2 -

POINT II
INDEFINITELY
SUSPEND THE IMPOSITION OF PROBATION
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II I cont'd J cuuld not have revoked something which had
never imposed, Moreover, Appellant could not have violated a
condition obation until the probationary term became
effective. Hence, the order to show cause hearing and the court's
decision to "revoke" probation, under any circumstance, - ;
erroneous.
'bin ,ior either lorm of error, .Joseph Moya has been,
improperly cominitted to serve "time" in the Salt Lake County Ja :i 1 or
the Utah State Prison since on or before November 10, 1988, the date
of the order to show cause hearing for "revoking his probation." On
February 13, 1990, the Board of Pardons "paroled" Joseph Moya after
he had already served time in prison for a sentence which the court
should not have reinstated. See Appellant's reply brief, Point II.
Despite these unlawful periods of confinement, the State implicitly
requests that this Court ignore the punishment previously an<i
improperly imposed. According to the State, Joseph Moya should
receive the full probationary term and its accompanying conditions,
but only "in the event that defendant [Moya] returns to Utah."
Appellee's brief at 10. On November 14, 1991, Appellant Moya's
period of "parole" will expire. If Appellant "returns to Utah"
after November 14, 1991, it would defy reason to then reinstate a
period of "probation" after he had already served his period of
"parole." The likelihood of this absurd result is a further reason
m I litating against indefinite suspensions of probata on.

completed.

See Appellant's opening brief, Point III & IV.B.

For

this appeal, it is important to distinguish between the actions
initially taken by the court and the inactions subsequently allowed
by the court.

The court's "original order" stated, inter alia:

Defendant is granted a stay of the sentence and
placed on probation in the custody of this Court
under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State
Department of Adult Parole for a period of 18
months, said conditions of probation to be stayed
until defendant [Moya] is returned from New Mexico.
See Addendum B.
Noteworthy here is what the court order did not express.
The court ruling did not state, "probation to be stayed until
defendant returns from New Mexico."

Rather, the court stayed the

imposition of probation "until defendant is returned from New
Mexico."

Addendum B.

procure his return.

The State of Utah, however, did nothing to

See Appellant's opening brief, Point III &

IV.B.
Moreover, if, as the State contends, "Defendant [Moya]
was released, not 'on his own recognizance,' . . . but to New Mexico
authorities who extradited him to that state[,]" Appellee's
brief at 9, Joseph Moya could not have been expected to return to
Utah on his own after the resolution of the New Mexico proceedings.
Indeed, AP&P could have extradited Moya back to Utah but it
explicitly chose to do otherwise.

In an incident report dated April

17, 1985, AP&P wrote:
Defendant [Moya] was released from the Salt Lake
County Jail on October 3, 1984, to the custody of
New Mexico authorities. He has remained in their
custody, in Rio Arriba County, and it appears now
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defendant to appear for sentencing on March 5, 1902. id.

After one

continuance, the court issued the following order on March 12, 1902:
"The defendant having been convicted of the crime of forgery, and
being now before the court to receive sentence, and the court being
sufficiently advised, it is ordered that sentence be, and the same
is hereby, suspended, and the defendant permitted to go upon his own
recognizance."

Id.

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court found that "[t]he
defendant, by this order, was, in effect, discharged from custody."
Id.

The question on appeal was, "did the [trial] court, by

indefinitely suspending sentence, lose jurisdiction of the . . .
defendant, or did it still retain jurisdiction, with legal power and
authority to sentence him to the state prison 11 months after he had
been discharged from custody?"

Flint, 71 P. 531. The answer for

both defendant Flint and Appellant Moya must be the same:
[The Utah Supreme Court knows] of no rule or
principle of law whereby a court can indefinitely
suspend sentence, keep the defendant in a state of
suspense and uncertainty, and, long after he has
been discharged from custody, have him rearrested,
and impose a sentence of either fine or imprisonment
on him. A suspension of sentence for an indefinite
period is, in effect, an exercise of the functions
of the pardoning power, which belongs exclusively to
the board of pardons. . . When the court suspended
judgment indefinitely, and ordered the defendant
discharged from custody, it no longer had
jurisdiction over him, and all subsequent
proceedings in the premises were unauthorized by
law, and are therefore void.
71 P. at 531-32.
The State attempted to distinguish these principles by
arguing that in Flint, "imposition of judgment and sentence was
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The State of Utah knew where Joseph Moya could be found and
still allowed him to remain there without seeking to impose
probation.

Utah did not request his return, by extradition or

otherwise, nor did it attempt to maintain supervision over him. Cf.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-24 (1989) ("Out-of-state supervision of
probationers and parolees").

Given these circumstances, the court's

approval of AP&P's recommendation effectively discharged Appellant
Moya from custody.

Cf. In re Flint, 71 P. 532 ("when a defendant

stands convicted, . . . it is the duty of the court to keep control
of the case . . . . " ) .

Moreover, even if Appellant's indefinite

grant of freedom outside the State of Utah was threatened "in the
event he decide[d] to return to Utah," he still could live in Utah
"on his own recognizance" as long as he remained "free" of a
warrant's check.
As recognized by the Court in State v. Gr€>en, 757 P.2d 462
(Utah 1988), the analogous principles of Flint defeated arguments
for an indefinite tolling of the probationary period.

Just as the

Green Court unanimously rejected the State's position "that there
[was] no time limit for initiating a [probation] revocation
actionf,]" id. at 464, Appellant Moya requests this Court to reject
the State's position that there is no time limit for imposing
probation.

The two concepts are one and the same in theory and

application.

Probation should not be indefinitely tolled nor should

it be indefinitely suspended.
was either revoked or imposed.

Decades could pass before probation
Defendants subject to either

scenario "would be left in a perpetual state of limbo[,] "

-8 -

especially where, as here, the court was aware of the defendant's
whereabouts though it still did nothing to retrieve him.

See

Appellant's opening brief, Points I, II, III, IV.B.
Both parties agree that the trial court's revocation of
Appellant Moya's probation was improper.

Joseph Moya "requests this

Court to reverse the lower court's decision and remand this case for
the entry of an order terminating Utah's custody over Appellant."
Appellant's opening brief at 24. The State requests that Appellant
Moya's "probation revocation should be reversed and the matter
remanded to the trial court for the execution of probation . . .
[I]n the event that defendant returns to Utah, probation should be
executed as originally ordered."

Appellee's brief at 9-10.

What the State is asking for now is what AP&P had asked for
before.

The request of both parties, if approved by this Court,

suspends indefinitely the time period for imposing probation.
State's request should be denied.

The

See also Appellant's reply brief

at 2-3 n.l.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant Moya respectfully requests this Court to reverse
the lower court's decision and remand this case for the entry of an
order terminating Utah's custody over Appellant.
Respectfully submitted this

day d>f September, 1990.

Rona{Ld S. Fujiho
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 23 6 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this V

day of September, 1990.

Ronald S.NFujino

this

DELIVERED by
day of September, 1990.

-10-

ADDENDUM A

PARDONS AND PAROLES

77-27-24. Out-of-state supervision of probationers and parolees — Compact.
The governor of this state is authorized to execute a compact on behalf of
the State of Utah with any other state legally joining therein. "State," as used
in this section, includes any state, territory or possession of the United States
and the District of Columbia. The compact shall be in the form substantially
as follows:
A compact entered into by and among the contracting states, signatories
thereto, with the consent of the Congress of the United States of America,
granted by an act entitled An Act Granting the Consent of Congress to any
two or more States to enter into Agreements or Compacts for cooperative
effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and for other purposes.
The contracting states solemnly agree:
Form of Compact.
(a) That it shall be competent for the duly constituted judicial and
administrative authorities of a state party to this compact (herein called
sending state) to permit any person convicted of an offense within such
state and placed on probation or released on parole to reside in any other
state party to this compact (herein called receiving state) while on probation or parole, if
(1) Such person is in fact a resident of or has his family residing
within the receiving state and can obtain employment there.
(2) Though not a resident of the receiving state and not having his
family residing there, the receiving state consents to such person
being sent there.
Before granting such permission, opportunity shall be granted to the receiving state to investigate the home and prospective employment of such person.

630
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A resident of the receiving state, within the meaning of this section, is one
who has been an actual inhabitant of such state continuously for more than
one year prior to his coming to the sending state and has not resided within
the sending state more than six continuous months immediately preceding
the commission of the offense for which he has been convicted.
Receiving State to Supervise Probationers or Parolees.
(b) That each receiving state will assume the duties of visitation of and
supervision over probationers or parolees of any sending state and in the
exercise of those duties will be governed by the same standards that
prevail for its own probationers and parolees.
Extraditions Procedure Waived, When.
(c) That duly accredited officers of a sending state may at all times
enter a receiving state and there apprehend and retake any person on
probation or parole from such sending state. For that purpose no formalities will be required other than establishing the authority of the officer
and the identity of the person to be retaken. All legal requirements to
obtain extradition of fugitives from justice are expressly waived on the
part of states party hereto as to such persons. The decision of the sending
state to retake a person on probation (or parole) shall be conclusive upon
and not reviewable within the receiving state; provided if at the time
when a state seeks to retake a probationer or parolee there should be
pending against him within the receiving state any criminal charge, or he
should be suspected of having committed within such state a criminal
offense, he shall not be retaken without the consent of the receiving state
until discharged from prosecution orfromimprisonment for such offense.
Transporting Prisoners.
(d) That the duly accredited officers of the sending state will be permitted to transport prisoners being retaken through any and all states parties to this compact without interference.
Rules and Regulations.
(e) That the governor of each state may designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other contracting states, if and when appointed, shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be deemed
necessary to more effectively carry out the terms of this compact.
Execution of Compact — Effect.
(f) That this compact shall become operative immediately upon its execution by any state as between it and any other state or states so executing. When executed it shall have the full force and effect of law within
such state, the form of execution to be in accordance with the laws of the
executing state.
Renunciation of Compact.
(g) That this compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon
each executing state until renounced by it. That duties and obligations
hereunder of a renouncing state shall continue as to parolees or probationers residing therein at the time of withdrawal until retaken or finally
discharged by the sending state. Renunciation of this compact shall be by
the same authority which executed it, on sending six months' notice in
writing of intention to withdraw from the compact to the other states
party thereto.
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JUL 2 6 1SS0
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON (3982)
Assistant Attorney General.
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JOSEPH FINANO MOYA,

:

ORDER
Case No.

841908921

judge Scott Daniels
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Based on plaintiff's motion for correction of clerical
error, hearing on the motion and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment
to the Utah State Prison dated September 13, 1984, is corrected
nunc pro tunc to read as follows:
Defendant is granted a stay of the
sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court under the supervision
of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of
Adult Parole for a period of 18 months, said
conditions of probation to be stayed until
defendant is returned from New Mexico.
Defendant i s ordered t o pay r e s t i t u t i o n
i n the amount of $700.00.

Defendant is to enter, participate, and
complete any alcohol rehabilitation program
directed by the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole.

J^>

DATED this

day of July, 1990.
BY THE COURT

ai

HQA

HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS
Third District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

R O N ^
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Order was mailed/ postage prepaid, to Ronald Fujino,
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300,
Salt Lake City, Utah,

84111, this (I/*day of July, 1990.

Vlnyy^
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ADDENDUM C

INCIDENT REPORT

DATE:
NAME:

MOYA, Joseph Finano, aka PADILLA

COURT:

April 17, 1985

COURT CASE NO.: CR 84-892

Third Judicial District

JUDGE:

Scott Daniels

DATE RECEIVED ON PROBATION: September 13, 1984

OFFENSE:

ADDRESS:

EMPLOYMENT:

Rio Arriba Co Jail, Espanola, N M

Burglary, Fel III 0

COMMENTS:
Reference our incident report of January 9, 1985, and the Pre-Sentence
Report of September 7, 1984.
Defendant was released from the Salt Lake County Jail on October 3,
1984, t o the custody of New Mexico authorities. He has remained in their
custody, in Rio Arriba County, and it appears now that the charges in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, will not be continued, due to prosecutorial problems.
This agency does not feel that it would be adviseable to extradite
defendant back to Utah, but we would request that a "Domestic" warrant be
issued to arrest defendant in the event he decides to return to. Utah ..//\

APPROVED
DENIED
DATE
COMMENT

IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY AGENT:

RECOMMENDATION:

j^CrtM

. r\
//

JCTf U « U ^
:

Obtained data, informed Supervisor and Court.

Request that N C I C, No Bail warrant of January 14, 1985, be

recalled, and that a "Domestic" warrant, with bail of $25,000.00 be issued.

EUGENE F. P R E S S E T T S U P E R V M

/JOHN W. MC NEILL DISTRICT AGENT

NOTET^This form i s used to report rule infractions to the Court.
Original stays in f i l e
Signed copy to Court
Other copies"as needed
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